May 15, 2022

The Rabbitt Review Reports: Nuclear Options Volume 2 ISSN 2752-9703




Volume 2


PWarning sign attached to vessel at Fremantle 

on return from Monte Bellos cJuly 1956 H

Opening of Olympic Games, Melbourne Novemb er 22, 1956E 1956 MELBOURNE OLYMPICS 

Sue Rabbitt Roff



Ebook first published in 2022. Last updated April 2022. Published by Sue Rabbitt Roff, Cellardyke, Scotland. 

The right of Sue Rabbitt Roff to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. 

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the pub lisher. All rights reserved. 

Copyright © 2022 Sue Rabbitt Roff



I greatly appreciate the support of librarians and archivists at: • Australian National Archives 

• Fenner Archives of the Australian Academy of Science • National Library of Australia 

• UK National Archives 

• Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge 

• Cadbury Special Collections at Birmingham University • Wren Library of Trinity College, Cambridge University • Dundee University Library and Archive Services • British Library 

• Los Alamos National Laboratory Library 

Alan Stewart has supported the project as online developer with wit and wisdom despite the stylistic and budgetary constraints. 

None of the above are responsible for the interpretations I have put on the material. 

Parts of this material have been published by Meanjin, the Conversa tion, the Atomic Heritage Foundation, Pearls & Irritations and CNN.


Section Three 

Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: Cockups and Coverups 


Randolph Stow 

In radio-active islands laid to sleep 

We have long ceased to wonder at the world, 

Knowing the causes must be grave and deep 

That bring on us these Armageddons, hurled 

Out of the heavens on our uncounted bones. 

Death having neither interests nor fears, 

Let nations, if they see a need, pull down 

A thousand skies and islands round their ears, 

We care not. Yet we muse, grown sage in ease, 

King James was not so wise a full as these.[1] 

In April 1949 Labor Prime Minister Ben Chifley agreed to host the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne – the first outside the northern hemi sphere. Melbourne won over Buenos Aires even though the eques trian events had to be held in Stockholm because of Australia’s strict horse quarantine rules. 

The horses and their riders were well out of it, because large areas of grazing land – the food chain of major cities such as Melbourne – were ‘top-dressed’ by radiation fallout from the nine atomic bombs deton ated by Britain in Australia before the November 1956 opening of the Games. Six of those detonations took place directly upwind of Mel bourne up to a month before the Games started. 

Yet in the thirty years I have been researching the British weapons tests in Australia I have found only one official reference to the im minence of the Olympic Games.

Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Prime Minister Robert Menzies agreed to the use of Australia as Bri tain’s atomic testing ground within hours of returning to office in December 1949, without consulting his Cabinet. Like Chifley, Men zies was – contrary to reports published by some researchers over the next seventy years – very keen to involve Australia in Britain’s post war ‘Empire Defence’ project. 

Again like Chifley, Menzies thought that the reward for ‘hosting’ the tests despite the hazards of radiation fallout would be Australia’s ac quisition of tactical nuclear weapons for its own regional defence. He and members of his Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee lobbied urgently in London for these as Britain began to withdraw east of Suez once it had detonated its first H bomb 636 km off Christmas Is land in May 1957. 

And we shall see that the weapons development carried out in Aus tralia moved from atomic to thermonuclear just months before the 1956 Olympics, in the development of the British thermonuclear H bomb. 

The official History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, published by the Australian. Department of Resources and Energy in 1985 states that by the time the Maralinga test site became operational in South Aus tralia in 1956 

a decision had been taken to look into the possibility of making thermonuclear systems . . . If the UK was to proceed with the development of thermonuclear weapons by about 1957, data were required for design purposes and these could only be ob tained in a real weapon test. 

The official history reports that the civil servants advised Menzies that the 1956 detonations at the Monte Bellos and Maralinga could be something approaching an H-bomb. Yet Menzies and his Cabinet and his Safety Committee allowed them to go ahead. And kept the shift to thermonuclear a secret from the Australian public. 

Atomic and thermonuclear testing in Australia continued throughout the sixteen years of Menzies’ second prime ministership. Why didn’t the McClelland Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Aus-

Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

tralia – convened by Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke twenty years later – look more closely at Menzies’ role? 

The force of the personality conflict between McClelland, a self described ‘good hater’, and Titterton probably explains – together with Anglophobia – why the Royal Commission did not see that it was seriously misreading Menzies’ role and responsibility in agreeing to British atomic tests and nuclear trials throughout his Prime Minis tership from 1949 until the mid 1960s. Menzies died in 1978. 

Reading the transcript of Ernest Titterton’s statements before the Royal Commission (File A6448.14 in the National Archives of Aus tralia, available to download) one has to wonder if McClelland’s dis like of the undoubtedly cocky Titterton came to distort his judgement when considering if and where culpability lay for the conduct of the tests in Australia to develop the British H bomb. 

And we need to examine the conspicuous absence of Australia’s senior atomic physicist, Professor Mark Oliphant, from the tests in Australia, many of which were carried out in the deserts of his home state, South Australia, of which he became Governor. Why did the Americans come to regard as a serious security risk the ‘Oliphant Group’ who had first conceptualised the making of an atom bomb in time to be used in the Second World War, then been seconded to the Manhattan Project to build what became the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs? In 1945 Oliphant was nominated for the highest medal for non-American participants in the Manhattan Project by its director General Groves, who was not unaware of his security indiscretions from the time he incautiously told Robert J Oppenheimer how to make the atom bomb. But by the time he returned to Australia in 1950 Oliphant was banned from the USA – and from British atomic and nuclear testing in Australia – by the Americans. He had been con sidered a security risk for a decade. 

Was there an Australian atomic spy at the Manhattan Project? Why was the individual suspected by the FBI never charged or brought to trial but left to teach in the UK in the postwar years? Was Oliphant a knave or a fool? Or was he Oppenheimered?

Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Here’s what archival research in Australia, the UK and the USA actu ally reveals about these and other questions even as files in the UK National Archives are being withdrawn without explanation and oth ers lie in the Australian Archives ‘unexamined’ thirty five years after the Royal Commission Report pulled its punches. 


When British Prime minister Harold Macmillan met his Indian coun terpart Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi in mid January 1958 the latter 

tried to argue in favour of suspension of nuclear tests, the aban donment of nuclear weapons, and all the rest of it. . . . He said that somebody had told him that you could make an H-bomb in your back garden. I said that this was not our experience. 

Indeed it wasn’t. It was in Australia’s, starting with the Monte Bello islands. 

Britain detonated its first acknowledged H-bomb seven months be fore Macmillan and Nehru met, in May 1957. But the field testing of the components of a post-atomic thermonuclear device was done in Australia, including the Mosaic detonations at the Monte Bello islands off Western Australia in June 1956, barely six months before the 1956 Olympics opened in Melbourne in November. 

Melbourne was downwind of all the 12 atomic detonations and the thermonuclear trials carried out by the British with the keen support of Prime Minister Robert Menzies and his minister of Supply Howard Beale throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 

This was despite the British public statements that they wouldn’t es calate from Atomic to Thermonuclear testing in Australia. But they did, with not only the acquiescence but also the active facilitation of Menzies and his Cabinet colleagues. 


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

It’s just over seventy years since a British Admiralty survey party vis ited the Monte Bellos and returned to London in early 1951 reporting that it could well serve as the site for the test that would make Britain the world’s third atomic weapons power in October 1952. Yet many files relating to the tests are being steadily withdrawn from public ac cess at the UK National Archives and other public depositories. 

And there are scores of files in the National Archives of Australia that have never been opened, most of them submitted to the Royal Com mission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia in the mid-1980s. Many of these files were generated by the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee (AWTSC), created as a fig leaf for the Menzies govern ment when the Australian public was getting twitchy about the first two series of tests, Hurricane in October 1952 at the Monte Bellos and Totem a year later at Emu Field in South Australia. 

After thirty years of studying the health effects of participation in the British tests on military personnel of the British, Australian, New Zea land, Fijian military ‘indoctrinee forces’ sent to the tests I have found it illuminating, often startling, to read the primary source documents I have found in the Australian National Archives and Fenner Archives of the Australian Academy of Sciences as well the UK Na tional Archives and British Library in London; the Churchill Archives Centre and Wren Library of Trinity College in Cambridge; and the Cadbury Research Collection of University of Birmingham vindicated that scepticism. Librarians and archivists at the University of Dundee, the British Library and the Los Alamos National Laboratory have been very helpful in locating and providing documents and audio re cordings. 

Then there are the official histories – one British, one Australian – pre pared for the Royal Commission that itself published a six hundred page report in early 1986 after eighteen months taking evidence in Australia and London. 

And the National Library of Australia TROVE collection of digitalised newspapers is a fine resource to read what Australians were allowed to read at the time of the tests.

Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Operation Epicure 

Countdown to the first British atomic bomb test 

In September 1950 Prime Minister Menzies agreed to UK requests to allow a reconnaissance of the Monte Bello islands off Western Aus tralia as the probable site for atomic bomb tests. 

According to a telegram[2] from the UK High Commissioner in Can berra to London ‘On reading Mr. Attlee’s message Mr. Menzies at once said that any special facilities which Australia might possess for this or similar purposes would of course be made available.’ He had ‘called Acting Minister for Defence (Mr McBride) into consultation and said that at this stage no-one else would be informed except Shedden [Secretary of the Department of Defence].’ Menzies recommended that ‘later if proposal eventuated he thought it would be desirable to take leader of Opposition into confidence’. 

To enhance security the British proposed to deal directly with Prime Minister Menzies, bypassing the Australian Resident Minister and Australian Service Liaison Staff in London.[3] The British officials in formed the Australian Prime Minister that the Australian Resident Minister ‘was informed orally’ of the correspondence between Atlee and Menzies ‘and would continue to be kept informed on a similar basis.’[4] Neither Menzies nor his officials seemed to think this high handedness should be commented on. 

As details began to be set out it was suggested[5] that a cover plan to conceal the real purpose of the work to be done at the Monte Bellos that would say that ‘object of survey party is to determine suitability of Monte Bello Group as instrumentation site for [Woomera] guided weapons range’. 

It was pointed out[6] that this wouldn’t work because 

Locale is so far off range orbit that camouflage would be seen through. But the more serious objection is that range being joint project Australians concerned would have to be and would in deed demand to be taken into confidence.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

The first suggestion was that ‘better cover would be something to do with anti-submarine defence’. 

It was explained[7] that ‘Object of cover plan is to deceive subordinate officials making administrative arrangements for survey’ and it must be kept secret to prevent ‘news getting to ears of technicians at [Woomera] long range weapons establishment who will know that supposed reason for the survey is nonsense’. 

On March 5, 1951 MP Mr Ormsby-Gore asked[8] the UK Minister of Supply ‘whether this country now possesses the technical knowledge required for the manufacture of atomic bombs’. The reply was ‘Yes.’ 

In late March Prime Minister Menzies in a Top Secret and Personal message[9] from Prime Minister Attlee was informed that ‘My col leagues and I have decided that to wait any longer for the Americans would mean subjecting our plans to an intolerable delay’ and asked permission ‘to go ahead now with preparations for a test in October 1952, which is the earliest date by which a prototype of our weapon will be ready.’ 

Attlee acknowledged that ‘It is of course wasteful and illogical to un dertake such a separate trial when the desired result could be achieved more economically if full United States co-operation were forthcoming.’ It would be wasteful in ‘men, money and material’. ‘Nevertheless’ Attlee continued, ‘it is quite clear that as matters stand there is no satisfactory alternative to our going ahead with prepara tions to hold the trial without United States help’. 

The Australian federal election following a double dissolution of Par liament was held on April 28, 1951. Menzies waited until he was re elected before he agreed in principle on May 10, 1951. He understood that the British were still trying to negotiate the use of Nevada to test its atomic bomb. 

Which is to say he kept his willingness to host British atomic weapons testing from the electorate as well as most of his Cabinet colleagues and the Opposition. His government was returned to top office but with a diminished vote.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

He was still keeping it quiet six weeks later. On June 29, 1951 the Min ister for Supply Mr Beale was asked[10] in Parliament if Australia ‘would provide an area for the testing of atomic weapons, including atom bombs?’ He replied that the report 

was completely false. No arrangement has been made for Aus tralia to use the guided weapons testing range or any other part of this country for the testing of atom bombs . . . The report was utterly without foundation. 

But less than three weeks after this emphatic statement the American columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop predicted in the New York Her ald-Tribune[11] that a British atom bomb would be tested in Australia within a year. They declared it ‘a partial failure of the Anglo-Amer ican partnership’ and commented that ‘For the British to test a bomb which cannot either be made or delivered in quantity amounts to a very costly psychological gesture’ to dispute that ‘their island has been transformed into a mere “airstrip No. 1” for the Americans’ since ‘the capacity to deliver bombs from the American atomic stockpile now squarely depends on overseas bases, controlled by the French, and above all by the British’. 

Throughout the rest of 1951 there was some hope of being able to test in Nevada. One proposal[12] put forward by the British negotiators was 

a line of argument which will contend that the McMahon Act does not prohibit the test of a weapon. That the weapon should happen to be British is no bar provided the President can be told that it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defence that it is in the interests of the United States that this British weapon should be tested in the United States . . . Briefly our case will be fought on the grounds that there is nothing against it in law. The President may however reject it on polit ical grounds. 

Wherever it was to be tested the British 

have been careful to explain to the Australians that, under the rules of our existing partnership with the United States and


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Canada, we shall be precluded from passing on to them some of the more secret scientific and engineering data about the United Kingdom weapon itself.[13] 

On August 24, 1951 an American official indicated[14] that 

he much hoped that it would be possible for us to give the Americans further time in which to come round. His latest in formation was that they were as anxious as we ourselves to avoid an independent test and were genuinely out to find a way through their legislative tangle that would enable them to offer their co-operation. 

A month later it was reported[15] that 

the Americans have suddenly, rather to our surprise, produced what appears at first sight to be an unexpectedly good offer, and one which, in spite of the progress made with Hurricane, we just cannot ignore. 

But the danger was that clever reading of the McMahon Act might be taken to mean that Britain could share its atomic developments with the USA but the USA might be able to claim that the Act prohibited it from reciprocating. As had happened with the fruits of the Manhattan Project. 

In November and early December 1951 the Australian Minister for Supply Beale was still denying in Parliament that there would be Brit ish atomic tests in Australia, and British officials were suggesting[16] it was time he was ‘brought into the picture’. 

On December 27, 1951 Menzies was informed[17] ‘that the United Kingdom Ministers have now decided to proceed with arrangements for the test in Australia’.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Operation Hurricane 1952 

The first British atomic test, Operation Hurricane in October 1952, was an underwater detonation in a lagoon of the Monte Bello islands off the coast of West Australia to investigate the impact of a detonation on naval vessels. 

According to the British official historian of the tests, Lorna Arnold, who published A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapons Tri als in Australia (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1987) thirty five years later: 

The fallout hazard . . . was expected to be very localized, with little if any risk of contaminating the Australian mainland – 47 miles to the south east at the nearest point – unless the wind was blowing from the Islands towards it. Meteorology was crucial to safety. 

The trouble was, anyone who knew anything about the weather pat terns of the Monte Bellos knew that the prevailing winds were west erlies, blowing onto the mainland. 

No Australian meteorologist had a senior role at this first test since 

provided the firing took place in the meteorological conditions specified, the [British] planners were confident there was no risk of significant [emphasis added] deposition of radioactivity on the mainland. On this the Australian authorities had to rely on the categorical assurance given by the British, as they did not have technical information about the test. 

Asking ‘How safe was Hurricane? Safety of the mainland’, Arnold wrote in her official history submitted to the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia in early 1986 that 

The islands themselves were, as expected, heavily contamin ated at some points and would remain so for a time. The survey in November 1953 found them still highly radioactive in places, but it was possible to use certain areas again in 1956. There


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

seems to have been negligible [emphasis added] radioactivity on the Australian mainland. 

That was less than 50 miles east – which is to say downwind of the detonation – equidistant from Onslow and Port Hedland. 

The proposed text[18] for Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s state ment on the test submitted to Allen Brown as Secretary of the Aus tralian Prime Minister’s Department on 22 October, 1952 stated ‘Con ditions were favourable and care was taken to wait for southerly winds so as to avoid the possibility of any significant concentration of radio-active particles spreading over the Australian mainland.’ 

The draft stated that ‘It may be said . . . that the weapon behaved ex actly as expected and forecast in many precise details by Dr W.G. Pen ney.’ 

However, the final draft[19] for Penney’s radio broadcast on November 3, 1952 differed: 

Many comments have been made about the shape of the cloud and how different it was from the mushroom cloud with the very high stalk shown in most American pictures of atomic ex plosions . . . The peculiar [sic] Z-shape of the cloud ten minutes or so after the explosion was due to the strong winds blowing in quite different directions [emphasis added] at different heights 

which he claimed resolved into ‘a gigantic spiral shape . . . rapidly moving northwards away from the islands and from the Mainland [sic]’. 

As early as May 1952 the UK had requested[20] cooperation from New Zealand for ‘the collection of airborne fission products’ up to 3,500 miles from the Monte Bellos in a trajectory that was expected to in clude Fiji. A subsequent memo[21] advised that 

A further examination of the meteorological data indicates that collection heights may be as low as 10-15,000 ft and that at these heights the cloud track may lie between Fiji and New Zealand taking one or two days to pass through the interception area.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

But even as Britain detonated its first atom bomb to show the Americ ans that it could become the third atomic power after the US had cut it off from post war defence science collaboration as soon as Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been bombed, it was obsolete. 

The Americans escalated to thermonuclear weapons testing less than a month after Hurricane demolished HMS PLYM in a lagoon. 

The race was now on to make a British thermonuclear, hydrogen bomb before the looming ban on atmospheric tests came into effect. Atomic bombs became merely the triggers to start the detonation of H-bombs. The Canberra Times of 3 November, 1953 immediately after the second series of tests, Totem, reported that Ernest Titterton, Pro fessor of Nuclear Physics at the Australian National University who was advising Prime minister Menzies on the safety of the British tests 

made it clear that the British programme was not related to the production of ‘baby’ atomic bombs. He said it was a waste of money to produce an atomic bomb in the ‘baby’ series with the equivalent of only a few tons of T.N.T. . . . Britain was improv ing techniques of producing weapons and finding out their per formances. 

In Australia. 

Operation Totem 1953 

‘very unusual meteorological conditions’ 

A year after Hurricane the testing moved on to the Australian main land, at Emu Field in South Australia. In October 1953 in Operation Totem, two bombs were detonated on 31 metre towers – less than a third the height of the top of the steeple of St Paul’s Cathedral in Mel bourne. The Central Park building in Perth is 249 metres to the top of its spire. 

The British official historian of the tests, Lorna Arnold, acknowledged in 1987 that


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

After extensive analysis and re-analysis of the Totem data, it had become clear by 1956 [emphasis added] that, because of the very unusual meteorological conditions, the early fallout from the first shot had been about twice that from the second . . . It was clear too that post-event analysis did not support the belief that the A32 [modelling] method of predicting contamination were [sic] safely pessimistic, partly because it had underestimated the proportion of the radioactive content of the cloud that would remain in the stem. 

But, Arnold explains, the British scientists 

were working in an atmosphere compounded equally of ex treme urgency and extreme uncertainty. They were under pres sure to complete their research and development programme as quickly as possible, to beat the ban on testing – and perhaps even a ban on fissile material production – that seemed inevit able sooner or later. This sense of urgency affected everyone on the project, and prompted the most strenuous efforts from sci entists, engineers and industrial workers alike. 

It also made the British feel the need of a ‘permanent proving ground’ because Emu Field was ‘a very restrictive site’. 


‘the Los Alamos of the British Commonwealth’ 

The 1985 Royal Commission into the British tests in Australia noted that 

There is a suggestion in a document of 25 January 1954 that the Australian Government would not want any publicity about a permanent proving ground until after the forthcoming Federal election (29 May 1954). 

There was however no discussion in the 1985 Royal Commission re port of the impending Olympics as this decision was made.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

In the event, the formal request did not come from the UK until 2 Au gust 1954. Agreement was sought in principle for a series of tests in 1956 and, as the necessity for trials to continue for ten years was en visaged, a permanent proving ground was considered desirable in the interests of efficiency and economy. 

The British official historian reports that the negotiations for a per manent test site were linked to an agreement on uranium supplies. ‘The British experts’, Arnold maintains, ‘believed that Maralinga, in suitable meteorological conditions [emphasis added], would provide a sufficient margin for higher-powered bursts than in previous trials, but there was no question of testing hydrogen weapons’. [emphasis added] 

In May 1955, eighteen months before the Olympic Games were due to start, Minister for Supply Howard Beale announced the building of ‘the Los Alamos of the British Commonwealth’ at Maralinga, prom ising that ‘tests would only take place in meteorological conditions which would carry radioactive clouds harmlessly away into the desert.’ 

According to the Royal Commission 

Beale made no secret about his views on the matter: ‘The whole project is a striking example of inter-Commonwealth cooperation on the grand scale. England has the bomb and the know how; we have the open spaces, much technical skill and a great willingness to help the Motherland. Between us we shall help to build the defences of the free world and make historic advances in harnessing the forces of nature.’ 

The Royal Commission concluded that 

The Australian Government had no intention of testing public reaction before deciding to agree to provide a permanent prov ing ground at Maralinga; no announcement was allowed until there was formal commitment.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Going Thermonuclear at the Monte Bellos 

Five Months before the 1956 Melbourne Olympics 

In June 1956, five months before the 1956 Olympics opened in Mel bourne, the UK detonated its third bomb at the Monte Bello Islands. Despite a score of public statements that it would not escalate weapons testing from atomic to thermonuclear by both British and Australian Prime Ministers and their government officials this was developmental testing for the ‘full-scale’ thermonuclear hydrogen bomb that was detonated off Christmas Island in the Pacific. 

The development of that fusion device continued in Australia until a month to the day of the start of the 1956 Olympic Games. 

I have only ever seen one reference to the imminence of the Mel bourne Olympics in the thousands of official documents I have stud ied in archives around the world from Canberra to London to Los Alamos. 

I have however found archival documents online confirming that the 1956 tests were thermonuclear rather than atomic despite repeated denials, circumlocutions and obfuscations by the UK and Australian governments. 


In April 1949 Labor Prime Minister Chifley had agreed to host the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne, the first to be held in the Southern Hemisphere. Within hours of taking office in December 1949 Prime Minister Menzies agreed in principle British atomic weapons tests be ginning in 1952 in Australia. 

The first British atomic bomb was detonated at the Monte Bello Is lands off the coast of Western Australia in October 1952, less than month before the United States detonated its first H bomb on Eniwe tok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. 

As Otto Frisch, one of the original designers of the Atomic Bomb said, atomic bombs were now merely triggers for thermonuclear bombs.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

The race was now on to make a British thermonuclear, hydrogen bomb before the looming ban on atmospheric tests came into effect. 

The official UK historian of the tests, Lorna Arnold, wrote in 1986 ‘The Australian Government took political risks in accepting the trials on Australian territory, but was astonishingly unexacting.’ She did not spell out how Menzies and his Minister for Supply Howard Beale came to knowingly accept the escalation from atomic fission to ther monuclear fusion testing in Australia. The documents I have been ex amining – which were supplied to the 1985 Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia – tell us how Menzies and his gov ernment buckled under pressure from Britain. 

The Australian Government permitted more than 100 ‘Kittens’ trials at Emu Field and Naya in South Australia from 1953. They were tests of the trigger or ‘initiator’ being designed for the H bomb detonated off Malden Island in 1957. They involved 150 lbs of natural uranium shipped in from the UK. 

At the same time the UK was negotiating a ‘Memorandum of Ar rangements’ for a permanent ‘Atomic Weapons Proving Ground’ at what came to be called Maralinga. This came into force in March 1956 and promised that ‘No thermo-nuclear (hydrogen) weapon will be tested on the site.’ [emphasis added] 

Promises, Promises 

Throughout 1954 the archival documents state several times that ‘there would be no question of testing thermonuclear weapons in Australia’. 

For instance on 18 February 1955 ‘Her Majesty’s Government wish to state categorically that there has never been any suggestion that a hydrogen bomb should be tested in Australia.’ A 1955 letter from Australian Prime Minister’s Department Department to the UK High Commissioner in Canberra restates ‘Hydrogen weapons will not be tested at the site’ [Maralinga]. [emphases in bold here and below ad ded]


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

On 18 February 1955 it was stated that ‘In view of statements which have appeared in the Press Her Majesty’s Government wish to state categorically that there has never been any suggestion that a hydro gen bomb should be tested in Australia.’ 

On February 22, 1955 it was reported that Australian Minister for Supply Howard Beale ‘concluded by repeating his earlier assurances that no hydrogen bomb tests or any tests of that character would be carried out’. 

For a few hours it seemed as though Beale was winning the argument. In the first week of April a telegram from the Commonwealth Rela tions Office in Downing Street to the UK High Commissioner in Can berra proposed that 

Though terms of assurance at the end of the statement merely repeat what has already been said by Mr. Beale, we suggest that a preferable wording would be ‘no hydrogen weapon test or tests of that magnitude will take place’. This wording is in accordance with Memorandum of Arrangements [being drafted for Maralinga] which precludes all hydrogen weapon tests not only bombs. The use of the word ‘magnitude’ recognises Aus tralian control over explosive yield from any test that it is agreed should be undertaken but if Australians prefer to repeat wording of previous announcement we would not press amendment. 

It was stated that the UK would use the term magnitude even if Aus tralia didn’t – ‘No hydrogen weapon test or tests of that magnitude will take place in Australia.’ 

Testing the Components for a Thermonuclear Bomb 

But parallel with these verbal parries, the Australian government per mitted ‘minor trials’ of components for the H bomb that the scientists were rushing to build for its scheduled detonation in May 1957 before the expected ban on atmospheric testing. The test site was one corner of the proposed ‘permanent proving ground’ of Maralinga. The ‘Kit-


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

tens’ initiator tests of 1955 involved conventional high explosives and 150 lb of natural uranium and resulted in significant contamination of the immediate firing range. 

On April 20, 1955 a UK memo stated 

As far as we know the initiator programme is still unchanged. . . . It has already been announced here that these minor tests are to take place. Originally Mr Beale hastily assured the press that these would not be in any way related to the hydrogen bomb. This was incorrect and he has since covered himself by saying that there will be no ‘hydrogen bomb test or tests of that nature and magnitude’

Sudden Need for a Second Round at the Monte Bellos 

Even as the Maralinga Memorandum was being negotiated in 1955 the UK Minister for Supply was drafting a message to the Australian Government advising that there was 

one more request to make of you. Maralinga will not be ready until September 1956. Our scientists on the other hand will be ready to make tests in April 1956 which are very urgently needed in the course of our development of more efficient weapons by inclusion of light elements as a boost . . . If we hold the tests in April we should save six months and also be able to make much fuller use and get more information out of the fir ings to be carried out at Maralinga in autumn [northern] 1956 . . . Our people have worked out what would seem to them to be the best methods of obtaining this much needed experimental information and have suggested that your agreement should be sought to a programme of two firings in the Monte Bello Islands in April 1956. The proposal is that the smaller of the two shots should be fired first and if this was completely successful the second and slightly larger shot would not be fired. Neither of the two would give a yield more than 2 ½ times greater than that of the bomb fired in Islands in the Hurricane Operation . . .


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

The typescript of the Australia Minister for Supply Beale’s announce ment of the Maralinga Agreement states ‘As I have said before, no hydrogen or similar types of bombs will be exploded in Australia.’ It was dated 4 May, 1955 the same day as the request for an unexpec ted two detonations in mid-1956 was being drafted in London. 

Another memo that same day from the UK Minister of Defence to the Foreign Secretary stated 

As an important step towards full-scale [sic] test of thermo nuclear weapons, the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment wish to carry out certain experiments in April 1956. These will take the form of atomic explosions, the yields of which will be boosted by the inclusion of light elements . . . in the Monte Bellos

There may be some difficulty with the Australians, in view of the definite statement made by the Australian Minister for Supply that no thermonuclear tests would be carried out in Australia. These experiments will, however, not be tests of ther monuclear weapons and their yield will not be more than 2 ½ times that of the weapon which we exploded in the Monte Bello Islands in 1953 [the year should have been 1952]. 

If that were the case, there should be ‘no difficulty with the Australi ans.’ But Australian officials, not least in Menzies’ Prime Minister’s Department, were beginning to suspect – because of the addition of thermonuclear ’booster’ light elements deuterium, tritium and lith ium – that ‘something approaching an H bomb’ was planned despite all the denials. 

British Prime Minister Eden told Prime Minister Menzies on 16 May 1955 in seeking agreement to 

a programme of two firings in Monte Bello Islands in April, 1956. Experiments would consist of atomic explosions with in clusion of light elements as a boost. It would, of course, be made clear in any public announcement that explosions were atomic and not thermonuclear.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Menzies replied on June 20, 1955: 

I notice from your description of the nature of the shots to be fired that each would give a yield considerably greater than in the case of the bomb fired in the ‘hurricane’ [sic] operation. In view of this I ask that the most meticulous care be exercised in the scientific checking of safety measures to ensure the safety of people and animals on the mainland. 

A concurrent message from Menzies’ Prime Minister’s Department made reference to ‘full scale tests to be carried out in 1957’. 

On 21 July 1955 a memo from the Commonwealth Relations Office in Downing Street to the UK High Commissioner in Canberra instructed ‘We certainly wish knowledge that there will be full scale tests in 1957 and connection between them and subject of Mr. Menzies’ message be limited to absolute minimum number of individuals.’ The reference was to the June 1955 message about the forthcoming Monte Bellos / Mosaic tests in mid 1956. 

The UK Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Earl of Home, toured Australia for a month from mid September 1955. He was advised in his briefing papers of the tangled web he would need to negotiate in relation to the proposed thermonuclear testing at the Monte Bellos. 

Along with these earlier documents there is one that is undated but filed around August 1955 titled BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE’S TOUR AUTUMN 1955 – TOP SECRET. 

The Earl of Home was advised that 

6. At an early stage in the negotiations with the Australian Gov ernment Mr. Beale, the Australian Minister for Supply, made categoric statements, without first consulting us, to the effect that the Australian Government had no intention of allowing H-bombs or any related experiments [emphasis in original] to take place in Australia. He subsequently modified the last por tion to ‘hydrogen bomb tests or any tests of that character’. [em phasis in original] Mr. Beale has, however, shown himself to be


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

extremely sensitive over the possibility of any thermo-nuclear weapon testing in Australia. 


7. We are anxious to carry out two experimental firings consist ing of atomic explosions with the inclusion of light elements as boost. The information obtained from these trials should be a vital link in the development of the thermo-nuclear weapon. We wish to carry out these trials next April, before Maralinga will be ready. We had agreed with the Australian Government that we would not test thermo-nuclear weapons in Australia but [emphasis added] Mr. Menzies has nevertheless [emphasis ad ded] agreed to the firings taking place in the Monte Bello Is lands (off the North-West coast of Western Australia), which have already been used before for atomic tests. As already ex plained, the Australians are very sensitive on the question of thermo-nuclear explosions, and although the true character of these tests is understood by the authorities immediately concerned, [em phasis added] knowledge of the trials is restricted to a very small circle and no public statement has so far been made; when it is made, it will therefore require very careful handling. 

All the documents discussed above are available for free download ing from the National Archives of Australia among the bundles of files that were submitted to the Royal Commission into Nuclear Tests in Australia in 1985 [A6455, RC 559, Part 3 Item 1905016]. There is no mention in any of them of the imminent 1956 Olympic Games. 

Indeed the Australian government had been ‘astonishingly unexact ing’ about the slide from atomic to thermonuclear testing. 

As was the Royal Commission in the mid 1980s. 

Despite the documents in File A6455 RC559 Part 3 [available online from the National Archives of Australia] having been submitted to the Australian Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in June 1985, the two documents referring to Beale being ‘incorrect’ about the nature of the initiator tests and Home being advised that the ‘true


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

nature’ of the Mosaic were known to the Australian ‘authorities imme diately concerned’ were not referred to in the Commission’s Report published in early 1986. 

In Volume 1 of the Report the role of light elements as boosts of a fis sion explosion is discussed (3.1.12-16) but it is concluded that the as pects as explained by the British messages to the Australian Prime Minister and his officials 

tends to bear out the Eden comment to Menzies that the Mosaic devices were not thermonuclear. [3.1.18] The British tests in Australia only included development tests up to the ‘atomic detonator’ stage and the test of a British H-bomb was under taken at Christmas Island in the Pacific in 1957. 

Kittens Trials continued at Maralinga in October 1955 and March 1956. 

Return to the Monte Bellos: 

Operation Mosaic 1956 – the wrong sort of winds 

On the tenth anniversary of the day, July 16 1945, that Titterton had detonated the world’s first atomic bomb, Trinity at Alamogordo in New Mexico, The New Yorker published a five thousand word article by Daniel Lang titled ‘Fallout’. 

He distinguished[22] between high-yield atmospheric bombs and ‘near surface’ explosions. 

A surface or near-surface shot ‘radiologically speaking . . . is an ex tremely dangerous proposition’. The bomb’s fireball ‘sucks up mil lions of tons of material from the surface of the earth – rocks, sand, vegetation, water . . . much of this debris is far too heavy to be blown around the world’. The winds ‘blow the fallout from a ground-level shot only far enough away from the testing site to make it a menace’. The highly radioactive material falls locally to ground zero.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Just outside the comparatively localised area, however, lies a much larger one that it definitely jeopardized by the fallout from a ground shot, for during the first few hours after the ex plosion some of the lighter fragments of debris spread out over thousands of square miles. 

On the day of the first of the six 1956 tests, back at the Monte Bellos despite the radioactive contamination from 1952 – six months before the opening of the Olympics in Melbourne – Ernest Titterton, the Eng lish physicist who had been appointed to a chair in nuclear physics at the Australian National University after working on the Manhattan Project and at Aldermaston, explained why the atomic devices were being tested in Australia. 

Because of the hazards from the radioactivity which follows atomic weapons explosions the tests are best carried out in isol ated regions – usually a desert area . . . Most of the radioactivity produced in the explosion is carried up in the mushroom cloud and drifts downward under atmospheric airstreams. But partic ular material in this cloud slowly settles to the ground and may render an area dangerously radioactive out to distances ranging between 50 and several hundred miles [emphasis added] . . . It would therefore be hazardous to explode even the smallest weapons in the UK, and it was natural for the mother country to seek test sites elsewhere in the Commonwealth. 

He made no mention of the imminent Olympic Games. 

Adelaide is 700 miles southeast of Maralinga and Melbourne is a fur ther 400 miles southeast as the winds blow. The prevailing winds were and still are westerlies blowing to the east. 


The first two 1956 detonations – known as Mosaic – took place in May and June back at the Monte Bellos despite their continued radioactive contamination from 1952. The first had a yield estimated at 15 kilo tons. The second was said to be an unexpected 60 kilotons – more than the combined yield of the four UK detonations to date. In fact, it was closer to 98 kilotons as we shall see.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

As one witness, a meteorologist, told the Royal Commission in 1985, 

The serious aspect was that however exact the forecast of the pattern might have been, given the different winds, if the winds were not the true winds that simply violated the whole 237 [pre dictive model] experience and it is, I am quite certain, nine tenths of the explanation of the departures were due to errors in the forecast of low level winds. 

The Australian meteorologist member of the ATWSC recorded on June 6, 1956 (five months before the Games were due to start) that the shape and height of the cloud were ‘somewhat different than expec ted’ and thought ‘The difference may have been due to an unexpec tedly high yield or because the arithmetical values of the parameters used in the computations did not completely fit the conditions of fir ing.’ The Royal Commission report acidly commented, ‘Either way, someone got it wrong!’ and concluded that ‘The Mosaic tests were conducted in a hurry under marginal meteorological conditions.’ 

In particular 

the fallout on the mainland following G2 [the June 19, 1956 det onation] was again greater than expected and occurred at loca tions where no fallout had been predicted. The post-firing winds behaved similarly to those after G1, i.e. they weakened and then began to blow to the south and east. 

The Royal Commission held that ‘The mainland contamination was a result of part of the cloud and stem drifting across the coast’ of north ern Australia and that the Safety Committee’s reports to the Minister ‘were misleading on the question of fallout on the mainland’. 

On 21 June 1956 the UK High Commission reported to London that ‘Australian Government have been embarrassed overnight by press story that atomic cloud drifted inland after explosion.’ Radioactive rain had been detected in north Queensland after G2, the so-called 60 kiloton blast.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Four days later the Melbourne Argus newspaper published an inter view with a Reader in Physics at the University of Melbourne head lined ‘We’re right in the path of atomic rains.’ Dr Hopper said 

We must learn to live with atomic rain, for it will probably fall in Victoria and New South Wales after the atomic explosions at Maralinga, South Australia, late this year. There will be no cause for panic. The radio-active rain will not be dangerous. But many people would feel easier if atom testing grounds had been set up off the east coast of Australia, rather than at Maralinga and Monte Bello in the west. 

He went on: 

It is no secret that wind under the 70,000 ft. level travels west to east all the year round. That’s the reason we must learn to live with radio-active rain. If atom bombs are going to be exploded at the permanent testing ground at Maralinga in the years ahead we are going to hear a lot about it in the future. If danger there could be, it would be in regard to the strontium content absorbed in the rain. If accumulated in the bones in sufficient strength, it could cause cancer. But it might be a cancer that would not be evident for 20 years or more. And who then could say that the cause was radioactive rain that might have fallen over Victoria in 1956? 

But lest he be thought to be scaremongering, Dr Hopper assured his readers 

Because of the long range work needed in the study of the ef fects of strontium on heredity, much has yet to be learned, but it is believed that radio-active rain, such as fell last week in Queensland, would have no ill-effects. 

Mr Patrick Sheehan, Head of the Mining and Metallurgy Department at the Ballarat School of Mines, was not so sure. He was reported in the Melbourne Argus of 28 August 1956 as saying 

Keep your overcoats on and get your umbrellas ready. And get your geiger [sic] counters out too. We are going to get THE BIG


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

RAIN within three to five days after the atomic explosions at Maralinga, South Australia, early next month. 

Mr Sheehan was worried about ‘what our own weather will be after Maralinga in September when the bombs will explode. THEY’LL EX PLODE JUST TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE OLYMPIC GAMES. [emphasis in original].’ This is the first of the two references to the conjunction of the atomic bomb tests and the Olympic Games I have found. 

Sheehan continued: 

Immediately after the second bomb [G2, June 19, 1956] was ex ploded the cloud confounded everyone by temporarily turning east. A few days later radioactive rain fell in Queensland 2,000 miles east. Mr Beale should have been told, so that he, in turn, could tell the people that no matter which way the cloud goes, the upper atmosphere winds over 30,000 ft invariably go from west to east, and so circle the earth. 

He noted that 

A Melbourne scientist has since pointed out that radioactive dust particles would be carried across the 1,000 miles from Maralinga to the east coast of Australia – and beyond. Until the matter is cleared up, atom bombs should not be exploded dur ing periods when heavy rain is normally expected. 

The Olympic Games would open a thousand miles to the east in three months, November 22, 1956. 

These two contemporaneous press reports indicate that even Aus tralian scientists outside those working at the Los Alamos of the Brit ish Commonwealth knew about the vagaries of wind-borne fallout patterns and the role of rain in helping radioactive particles to settle on the ground – and the possible long term effects of ingesting and inhaling the radioactive isotope, Strontium 90. 

But according to Minister Howard Beale, as reported in the Mel bourne Herald on June 21, 1956, the Chairman of Australia’s Atomic


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Weapons Tests Safety Committee Professor Leslie Martin of the Uni versity of Melbourne who was at the Monte Bellos for Mosaic as he had been for Hurricane ‘has reported to me that conditions of firing were ideal, and there was absolutely no danger to the mainland’. 

Curiously, an editorial sidebar on the front page of the Herald ran alongside this 1956 report of ‘A-CLOUD OFF W.A. COAST SAYS BEALE’ pointing out ‘If their confidence in safety measures is estab lished most people will accept the case for continued atomic and thermo-nuclear trials.’ [emphasis added] 

The 98 Kiloton Question 

On 1 October 1984 as the Royal Commission was setting up business, the Canberra Times raised particular concerns about the second 1956 Monte Bellos Mosaic test, G2. It had been stated that G2 would have a smaller yield than G1. But it was reported in 1956 as being four times the 15 kiloton yield of G1. Sixty kilotons was more than the first four detonations combined – 58 kilotons. 

One explanation could be that the British expected the test to be smaller than it actually turned out. Could it be that they got a fusion, or thermonuclear, reaction, that they did not intend? 

The ‘British authorities in Australia’ replied curtly and emphatically to questions from the Canberra Times ‘No, G2 was not a thermonuclear weapon.’ 

Around the same time, a rumour started that the yield of G2 was ac tually 98 kilotons. In 2014 Zeb Leonard traced through the life of this rumour in a useful article titled ‘Tampering with history: varied un derstanding of Operation Mosaic’ in the Journal of Australian Studies. He concluded that it was ‘a disputed claim’ and that even 98 kilotons is well short of the megaton range that we have come to expect from thermonuclear detonations. (It is unfortunately said to be the yield of each of more than a hundred nuclear warheads stockpiled by the UK these days.)


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

So it is interesting to note that the obituary of the commander of the Task Force for Operation Mosaic, Commodore Martell, in the UK Inde pendent in October 1999 stated that 

There was urgent operational research to be done before Oper ation Grapple, the series of tests on the use of atomic bombs as triggers for their thermo-nuclear descendant which would be carried out at Christmas Island the following year 

and lists the second yield as 98 kilotons. It was written by a well-re spected obituarist of senior naval personnel, A.B. Sainsbury, and doesn’t seem to have been challenged by officialdom. In fact the web site of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (accessed February 2022) lists it as 98 kilotons.[23] 

It may well be that the light element ‘boosters’ in the second Monte Bello series worked rather more strongly than the weaponeers expec ted. 

Of the 200 kiloton yield of the ten bombs detonated in the four years following October 1952 to October 1956, 140 kilotons were detonated in the six months prior to the opening of the 1956 Olympics down wind of the Monte Bellos and Maralinga in Melbourne.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

In April 1957, a year after the Mosaic tests and trials at the Monte Bel los, Neville Shute’s novel On the Beach (London, Heinemann) was published. The plot is premised on radioactive fallout travelling around the world eastwards from the original conflict in the Northern hemisphere, borne by the prevailing westerlies. 

The Memorandum of Agreement 

for a Permanent Proving Ground 

Having contaminated the Monte Bellos to the extent that they and their waters were too radioactive to be used for the first stages of the development of the components for a British H-bomb, the tests had been moved to Emu Field in South Australia for the Totem detona tions and trials of trigger mechanisms in 1953. 

That proved to be a hard place to support logistically and a search was undertaken for a ‘permanent proving ground’ which was to be come known as Maralinga. But it would take time to prepare the new site to become ‘the arsenal of empire’, the ‘Los Alamos of the Com monwealth’ as Menzies’ minister of Supply Howard Beale, in charge of Australia’s participation in the Anglo-Australian collaboration, proudly referred to it. 

The British Government began negotiations[24] – with Prime Minister Menzies’ Departmental Secretary Allen Brown – for a permanent ‘atomic weapon proving ground’ in June 1953, even as they were working on the last minute planning for Operation Totem that took place in mid-October at Emu Field. 

Brown was informed at the end of October, 1953 – after the Totem tests – that for the future 

The U.K. Chiefs of Staff have advised that the primary purpose of such a proving ground should be to test and improve the nuclear performance of weapons and that the test of atomic weapon effects should take a subsidiary place. [emphasis ad ded]


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

I have found that as well as the looming test ban, there was another pressure on the Menzies government from the British weaponeers that hasn’t been fully appreciated by researchers into the policy mak ing of the nuclear collaboration that lasted through the life of the second Menzies Prime ministership in the 1950s and 1960s. 

Even Menzies drew the line at public awareness of thermonuclear tests – or detonations – on the Australian mainland. Throughout 1955 until March, 1956 he was negotiating a ‘Memorandum of arrange ments’ for the establishment of Maralinga ‘as a proving ground and its use for atomic weapon trials’ for ten years. 

Paragraph 6 consists of one line: ‘No thermo-nuclear (hydrogen) weapon will be tested on the site.’ It was a masterpiece of British drafting. 

No nuclear weapon, but components for one were not excluded from being tested or trialled at Maralinga when it became operational – or elsewhere such as the Monte Bellos. And they were. 

The Argus reported in February 1955 that 

The Commonwealth Government will not allow any country to make or test hydrogen bombs in Australia, Mr. Beale, minister for Supply, said in Sydney yesterday. ‘I assert this categoric ally,’ he declared. His statement followed Britain’s soberly worded announcement that she had decided to produce H bombs and a suggestion that they would be tested here. Mr. Beale emphatically denied a statement attributed to a British Atomic Energy Authority spokesman that Britain was negotiat ing for an Australian site to test and make H-bombs. ‘The al leged spokesman is not telling the truth. The Federal Govern ment has no intention of allowing any hydrogen bomb tests to take place in Australia.’ 

For avoidance of public doubt, minister Beale also said ‘Nor has it any intention of allowing any experiments connected with hydrogen bomb tests to take place here.’


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

A year later the Canberra Times reported in mid February 1956 that ‘no hydrogen bomb would be exploded in or near Australia during the forthcoming tests, Mr Beale said last night’. He said ‘Press claims that a hydrogen bomb would be exploded were not true. The test at Monte Bello . . . would be an atomic bomb test.’ 

Parallel with – indeed because of – the negotiations that led to the Memorandum of Agreements about Maralinga the British pressed the Menzies government to allow an unexpected second test series at the Monte Bellos. It came to be named Operation Mosaic and took place in May and June 1956, weeks after the Memorandum had been agreed in March and only weeks before the Olympics took place in Mel bourne in November 1956. 

In a letter dated 16 May 1955 British Prime Minister Anthony Eden asked Menzies to permit a third series of tests, to be held at the Monte 


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Bellos despite their continued contamination from Hurricane. Eden in formed Menzies 

The experiments would consist of atomic explosions with the inclusion of light elements as a boost. It would of course be made clear in any public announcement that the explosions were atomic and not thermonuclear . . . 

That Mosaic was a ‘necessary preliminary to Grapple in order to design those tests’ – which were the detonation of Britain’s first H bomb near Christmas Island in May 1957 – was repeated as recently as 2016 by the Australian Air Power Development Centre in the seventh volume of its Pathfinder Collection about the evolution of contemporary air power. 

Formation of the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee (AWTSC) – ‘no conflict of interest’ 

The Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee was established for the 1956 tests. Its purpose, according to the 1985 Royal Commission Re port was 

to examine information and other data supplied by the United Kingdom Government relating to atomic weapons tests from time to time to be carried out in Australia for the purpose of de termining whether the safety measures proposed to be taken in relation to such tests are adequate for the prevention of injury to persons or damage to livestock and other property as a result of such tests. 

Essentially the AWTSC’s task was meteorological – the Royal Com mission accepted that ‘meteorological tasks were an Australian re sponsibility’ at Operation Buffalo, the four tests conducted in Septem ber and October 1956 upwind of the venue for the 1956 Olympics scheduled for November. 

Five physicists were originally appointed to the AWTSC. One of them was Ernest Titterton whom even the UK official historian acknow-


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

ledged was ‘a very new Australian with close United Kingdom ties and a Los Alamos background’ and whose position ‘was bound to be seen by many as an ambiguous one’. 

The 1985 Royal Commission stated baldly: 

Titterton had been intimately involved in ensuring the success of the atomic tests at Hurricane and Totem and could not be de scribed as a guardian of Australian public interest. 

The Commission considered that when he was appointed to the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee in 1956, 

The Australian Prime Minister’s stated requirements for the members of the AWTSC not to have any conflict of interests in relation to the success of the atom weapons test program was not met with respect to Titterton. 

In fact, as we shall see, almost all of the original members of the AWTSC had experience and current responsibilities in military weapons science. 

As an afterthought the Director of the Australian Bureau of Meteoro logy was co-opted on to the AWTSC. But there were no biologists on the AWTSC who could have advised about intake of radioactive particles by humans or animals. 

The AWTSC members were officially said never to have been privy to technical information about the composition of the bombs but were only permitted to know the estimated yield in order to decide whether it was ‘safe’ to detonate them – that is to say, whether the weather conditions would carry the expected radioactivity away from the major cities and towns which were mainly to the east and south east of the ground zeros at Monte Bello and Maralinga. This was clearly not the case with Ernest Titterton. 

It was accepted by the AWTSC that there would be dangerous con tamination of the immediate area around the blasts, and the ‘interme diate zone’ up to four hundred miles radius from ground zero which was held to be sparsely populated, mostly by Aboriginal people. The


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

present discussion is focussed on the ‘long range’ contamination bey ond the intermediate zone in the months before Melbourne was the venue for the Olympics in November 1956. 


In August 1952 William Penney proposed[25] to Lord Cherwell that as well as the recently arrived [in Australia] English physicist Ernest Tit terton the Scientific Adviser to the Australian Department of Defence, Professor I.E. Martin, should be ‘invited to join the Health Physics team at Monte Bello’. 

Martin had worked at the Cavendish Institute in Cambridge for sev eral years where he impressed Penney as being ‘able, sensible and dis creet’. He 

already has shown an excellent spirit of collaboration and a realisation of the security aspects of the matter when he carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the proposed A.W. [Atomic Weapons] Site. 

Penney saw as one of the advantages of this proposal was that 

We have not treated the Australian very generously in the way of inviting their scientific help, and the invitation to Prof. Martin would, I think, give them pleasure and would make them feel that we were not attempting to use their land but at the same time were keeping them out. 

It was agreed[26] that the UK should approach the Australian Govern ment to propose Martin as an Australian adviser at the first atomic bomb test but also as a working member of the Health Physics team. 

It was pointed out[27] that 

The Commonwealth Government are likely to be nervous about the use of a site in the heart of the continent for atomic weapons tests, and may have to face criticism from their own people. It is obviously desirable that one of their own scientists should be able to advise them from first-hand knowledge, and it seems


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

right to use the Monte Bello test as an opportunity for indoctrin ating such a scientist. 

The writer acknowledged that ‘the best way’ to proceed would be to ask the Australian government ‘to make a nomination for this pur pose, but we cannot risk their unfettered choice’. 

This proposal, the writer recognised, ‘may cause fresh trouble with Oliphant, but no doubt the Commonwealth Government can deal with that’. 

In August 1952 a British official wrote[28] 

I have only one comment as regards procedure. As Professor Martin is Scientific Advisor to the Australian Department of De fence, I am sure that we must approach the Australian Govern ment, though we can leave it to our people on the spot to decide whether to do this before Martin has been sounded or after wards. 

Martin was duly invited[29] to ‘join the Health Physics Team at Monte Bello’. The official memo[30] to Martin from the British officials in formed him ‘official action is being taken to inform Australian gov ernment’. 

In mid September 1952 the Australian Minister for Supply was repor ted[31] to be asking British officials if W.A.S. Butement could attend. Penney ‘thinks we should agree to the Australian request provided Torlese [Hurricane Task Force Commander] can accommodate him’. Torlese indicated that ‘on the assumption that butement [sic] is a “worker” he can accommodate him.’ 

When Lord Cherwell was asked about the proposal he reportedly[32] 

realised it was not possible to refuse to accept Butement unless lack of accommodation provides a valid excuse, but he is not too happy about this addition to the team. He would, therefore, like a personal cable sent to Penney saying that while we agree to this proposal we assume that he will have no access to vital efficiency data.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

The UK High Commissioner in Australia was instructed[33] on 18 September 1952 that ‘We are agreeable to attendance of Butement at Hurricane test. Please issue appropriate invitation to Australian au thorities as soon as possible.’ 

Penney was sent a Top Secret message[34] on 19 September from Lord Cherwell: ‘Have agreed somewhat reluctantly about Butement. As sume he will not have access to efficiency data’ and that ‘Invitation being passed to Australian authorities by U.K. High Commissioner.’ 

On September 24 a UK civil servant wrote[35] 

I am informed on good authority that Butement accompanied Dr. Penney from Woomera and proceeded to Monte Bello. His arrival there must have come as big a shock to the Admiral [Tor lese] as was the news to me, for at no time have I or Capt. Mc Nicoll heard that his visit to the islands was in the plan. I can only surmise that Dr. Penney decided unilaterally to take him. 

The press release[36] issued after the Hurricane test referred to the pres ence of ‘three Australian’ scientists – Professor L.H. Martin, Defence Scientific Advisor and Professor of Physics at the University of Mel bourne; Professor E.W. Titterton, Professor Nuclear Physics at the Australian National University, and Dr. W.S. Butement, Chief Scient ist of the Department of Supply. In this capacity Butement was the responsible officer for the Long Range Weapons Research Establish ment that had been developed at Woomera in the late 1940s. 

Which is to say all three had been nominated to join the scientific team by Penney, ratified by the UK government and then proposed to the Australian government as ‘Australian scientists’ who would each also be assigned[37] a scientific ‘task’ in the operation to build Britain’s first atom bomb. All three were involved in military defence science. 


So Titterton had been appointed by Prime Minister Menzies to be ‘Australia’s safety advisor’ to the first and subsequent tests not des pite but because he had been the electronics specialist who had de signed the trigger that detonated the world’s first atomic bomb at Ala-


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

magordo in July 1945; was a critical member of the Manhattan Project team that dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki a month later; and been entrusted by the Americans with conducting the countdown for Shot Baker in the Bikini tests of 1946. 

He had also been invited – but declined – to take a leading scientific role in the first test, Hurricane, by the Trial Director Dr Penney. 

One of the first questions Titterton was asked in his initial appear ance[38] before the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia in May 1985 was whether he had ‘done any work which today would be described as health physics work? Had you done anything in relation to radiation and human biology?’ 

He replied: ‘I had, of course, because any time one is involved in ra dioactivity and its possible health effects, so essentially I began at the beginning and grew up with this thing.’ 

But when he was asked ‘Did you ever publish anything in relation to health effects?’ Titterton replied ‘No. It was no ambition of mine. I was interested in publishing in relation to radioactivity and nuclear physics; the other was incidental.’ 

In fact several papers among Titterton’s research output from Har well in the late 1940s related to the invention of personal radiation do simeters for atomic workers. A 1959 Annotated Bibliography of Photo graphic Dosimetry lists 4 articles in 1949 and 1950 alone, before Titter ton left the UK for Canberra. He reported in Nature (163, 990-1, 1949) of the method he was developing for personal radiation badges to measure exposure that ‘An accuracy to within 5% can be achieved in dose determinations without undue elaboration of measurement and calibration.’ 

In an AERE report (AERE-G/R-362. 1949) the same year he confirmed that ‘one observer working full-time can determine fortnightly slow neutron doses for between 100-150 individuals’. He repeated these findings in the British Journal of Radiology (23, 465-71) in 1950 stating 

The photographic plate technique, using boron and lithium loaded emulsions, has been applied to provide a slow neutron


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

personnel monitoring service. The method is simple and eco nomical in operation, and is sufficiently sensitive to reduce the necessary microscope work to insignificant proportions. 

But Titterton consistently downplayed the dangers of human radi ation exposure in Chapter 13 of his 1956 book Facing the Atomic Future – The Health Hazards of Atomic Energy.[39] 

Written largely during voyages to from Australia to the UK in 1954 he reminded readers of this book intended for general public consump tion that ‘It is dangerous to work in a coal-mine, drive a motor-car and swim at an ocean beach.’ Accidents such as the irradiation of the Ja panese fishing vessel the Fukurya Maru by the American hydrogen ex plosion on March 1, 1954 killing a crewman was a ‘mishap’ that had been ‘magnified out of all proportion’ and he emphasised the need to ‘balance the production and testing of the weapons, which do so much to preserve our present uneasy peace’. 

Like most of his scientific colleagues at this time (and until the 1970s) Titterton believed that damage to human health 

requires a certain minimum dose, the threshold dose, before a biological effect can be observed. That is, damage is absent be low a certain value of irradiation, and it is on the basis of this effect that the so-called ‘tolerance’ or ‘permissible’ dose of radi ation, to which it is supposed to be safe to expose individuals, is calculated. 

Oddly, despite his own research, the ‘safety advisor’ to the Australian government apparently didn’t think it necessary to conduct field tests with the personnel sent to the weapons tests or the populations downwind of them, nor the Aboriginals living close to the epicentres of the detonations. Forty years later Titterton told his former col leagues in a speech at the 40th anniversary of the Los Alamos National Laboratory that Australia was ‘mostly devoid of population’ except on its east coast. 

Titterton did acknowledge the value of blood tests in this chapter, but the samples taken from participants of the tests in Australia have been lost.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

He also accepted that genetic damage especially from x-rays during pregnancy could occur and that there was no threshold or minimum dose required to trigger it. But he thought 

the very widespread use of radiation in diagnosis nowadays, and the therapy which is growing, involves potential hazards to the whole population which could be far more serious in the long run than exposure to the radiations which will result from the development of atomic energy projects and the explosion of atomic weapons. 

Titterton pointed out that 

On the [non-military] atomic energy project workers are protec ted both by shielding and also by measuring instruments . . . It is usual for each individual to be equipped with devices such as photographic films or small ionisation chambers which meas ure the radiation to which he has been exposed. The precautions which are being taken have been highly successful, and it is es tablished fact that in the atomic energy projects of the U.K. and the U.S.A. the health record has been far better than that of any other industrial project of comparable size. 

The radiation badges worn by some of the servicemen at the tests for which Titterton was safety advisor have been lost. 

Professor Titterton’s colleagues J.O. Newton and John Jenkin state in a biographical article published in the Australian Dictionary of Bio graphy that as Head of Department at ANU ‘he did not allow staff or students to wear radiation badges to monitor personal exposure’. It’s remarkable that this information did not cause comment when it was published in 2012, but that is a sign of the way in which public memory of the 15 years of British testing of atomic bombs and then components for the thermonuclear H bomb tested off Christmas Is land in May 1957 has been eroded and so many of the facts buried. 

Titterton, Martin and Butement all actively participated in – not merely monitored or observed – the 1952 Hurricane and 1953 Totem tests. In May 1955 Prime Minister got around to forming an Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee. While his Department of Defence


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

thought it would be sufficient to just constitute the Committee from these three scientists, Menzies favoured adding two more – J.P. Baxter and C.E. Eddy. He wrote[40] to his Minister for Defence McBride 

I believe that the Committee must include members who are sufficiently well known to command general confidence as guardians of the public interest and who are not in any way to be identified as having an interest in the success of defence atomic experiments. I doubt whether a Committee of less than five could be constituted which would meet these requirements, particularly if the Defence Scientific Advisor and Chief Scientist of the Department of Supply are to be concluded. 

Eddy was Director of the Commonwealth X-ray and Radium Laborat ory and Baxter was a member and later Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. As the British official historian com ments[41] ‘Somewhat surprisingly the list had no meteorologist, but L.J. Dwyer, the Director of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology was later co-opted.’ 

She also comments ‘Professor Oliphant, Australia’s most distin guished nuclear scientist, was not included.’ 

AWTSC press releases 

File A6455, RC596 was submitted to the Royal Commission in June 1985. It contains 150 pages of press releases created by the Beale’s Ministry of Supply for release under the ‘sponsorship’ of the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee in the weeks up to the four detona tions of Operation Buffalo at Maralinga in September and October un til only a month before the 1956 Olympics opened in Melbourne – of which there was absolutely no mention. 

The releases are each several typed pages in length. They were draf ted by two officers of the Australian Department of Supply. After vet ting by the Minister they were sent close to the date of their publica tion to the Chair of the AWTSC, Professor Martin.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

By August 20, 1956 the AWTSC particularly objected to the one on Civil Defence implications and the one on ‘The Need for Atomic Weapon Trials’ (which they thought was best released under the Min ister’s signature). 

The Safety Committee expressed the view that it should not be called on to agree to statements over its name on subjects not appropriate to its terms of reference, and considered that Civil Defence is one of these. The Safety Committee is quite prepared to vet articles as to the accuracy of their scientific content, but it does not wish to be responsible for articles on miscellaneous topics. 

By August 22, 1956 the AWTSC was asking that the Ministry of Sup ply, responsible for the Australian contribution to the tests, ‘should obtain an alternative sponsor for these articles’. 

Even so the AWTSC Chair agreed that not all articles had to be signed off by the individual members on 28 August if he was prepared to authorise them as Chair. 

But the next day internal correspondence in the Department of Sup ply reports that the AWTSC was still pressing for an ‘alternative sponsor’. The Secretary for the Supply Department suggested to Min ister Beale that he should call Professor Martin and remind him that 



Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Newspapers throughout Australia had been alerted to expect the art icles, attributed to the Safety Committee. 


It was recommended that the Minister should suggest that henceforth copies of the releases should be sent to Professor Martin and Professor Titterton – 


And so it was that the members of the AWTSC, three of whom had originally been proposed for the testing programme by the UK, signed off on press releases and statements by Minister Beale. They affirmed that 

the radiation safety at Maralinga is as good as in any factory or laboratory working on atomic energy and the staff are quite happy in the efficient organization which so rigidly enforces the control of exposure to radiation laid down by the world’s med ical experts and accepted universally as safe working condi tions. 

One of the reasons Maralinga was so suitable for the tests, it was said, 

is because of the large tracts of land to the northern part of the area where there are no people or stock . . . Because of the ab sence of local inhabitants no warnings are needed except to the people belonging to the range at Maralinga who can easily be accounted for. 

There will be a ‘trail of radioactive particles which fall from the cloud’ but these ‘do not constitute a hazard to any living thing outside the huge test area itself.’


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Operation Buffalo 1956 – the wrong sort of rain 

The AWTSC sought guidance from the Government about acceptable levels of contamination for the four Buffalo firings in September and October 1956 since ‘It is manifestly impossible to prevent radioactiv ity from falling on the mainland in the case of the Maralinga tests.’ It was also concerned about fallout from rain ‘at great distances’. The Safety Committee seems to have made no mention – on paper at least – of the approaching Olympic Games. But even seventy years later, not all the Safety Committee’s Minutes have been ‘examined’ for pub lic access according to the catalogue in the National Archives of Aus tralia. 

The 1985 Royal Commission report states 

an examination of the Safety Committee report to Cabinet and the Minute recording Cabinet’s decision indicates that the Aus tralian Government was apprised in considerable detail of the Buffalo program and the possible safety ramifications away from the Range. 

It notes that ‘The Cabinet decision was taken in an atmosphere of public opposition to the test program in Australia’ but – thirty years after the events – does not mention the imminence of the Olympic Games. 

Rain fallout was presented as a political difficulty rather than a health hazard. It was repeatedly stated that the levels of radioactivity bey ond the intermediate (400 mile) radius would be too low to be harm ful to humans or animals. The Royal Commission however noted that 

Rainout of suspended radioactive material in rain can cause high levels of contamination. The sticky papers [the basic method of collecting fallout even today] are not effective in heavy rain because rain running off the paper not only carries its own load of activity but can wash off the fallout already col lected. 

Thirty years later, the Royal Commission concluded that Buffalo Round I, the first detonation at Maralinga, less than two months be-


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

fore the opening of the Olympics, ‘was fired at a time when the fallout was predicted to violate the firing conditions that had been proposed by the Safety Committee and agreed to by the Government’. 

The firing was repeatedly delayed, to the extent that concern was ex pressed in the press and Parliament ‘that the delay was evidence of the great danger that the tests posed’ – but no mention was made of the approaching Olympics. The UK official history says 

Penney signalled . . . Main worry Safety Committee thunder storms Adelaide to Melbourne. This was political and not safety . . . Real culprit is completely exceptional weather. Conditions vary widely every few hours and Australian meteorological grid cannot cope with fine structure . . . Am studying arrange ments firings but not easy. Have Olympic Games in mind but still believe weather will not continue bad . . . We can never guar antee that activity will not be found in rain 500 or more miles away. [emphasis added] 

This is the only reference to the Olympic Games I have found in the official archival documents I have read over the past thirty years about the British atomic tests in Australia. Neither the Australian nor the UK official historian mentioned their imminence thirty years later in material submitted to the Royal Commission – which also does not refer to the dangers of continuing to test up to a month before the Games commenced. 

Two days after the first detonation in September 1956 the Melbourne Argus reported that 

Mr. Beale, Supply Minister today issued three separate Press statements all emphasising that there was no need for alarm by any-one anywhere following yesterday’s atomic explosion at Maralinga. He received this message from Professor Martin, Australian safety committee chairman: ‘You can give the public an unequivocal assurance of a complete bill of health. All dan gerous fall-out has been deposited and the remaining fall-out is completely innocuous. There is no possible risk of harm now or at any future time, to any persons, stock or property.’


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Minister Beale denied that the scientists had only 50 minutes’ warn ing of a wind change: 

They can guarantee safety because the weather information available is the most complete assembled in Australia. Mr Beale said there was no likelihood of a change in the wind after the A bomb firing, because the firing was not ordered unless the met eorological reports ensured a ‘consistent stable weather pattern’ until well after the heavy particles were deposited in the desert. Melbourne’s rain yesterday was NOT radioactive. Department of Supply scientists who made tests on Melbourne’s rain yester day said some radioactivity from the Maralinga explosion might be evident in three or four days. Tests would be made daily. Weather Bureau Officials said showers yesterday were in no way connected with the Maralinga explosion. 

In a section headed Meteorology the UK official historian acknow ledged in 1987 that ‘The wind structure at Maralinga turned out to be so complex, and so difficult to forecast in detail, that little confidence could be placed in the predicted fallout pattern.’ [emphasis added] 

In fact, ‘At Maralinga, firings had to be carried out in essentially tran sient conditions markedly different from those expected’ and the trick was ‘to catch these fleeting opportunities’. In a section headed Bombs on a shoe-string she wrote ‘from a meteorological point of view Maralinga – like Monte Bello – had been far from ideal, and had never looked very promising’. 

The Official Report[42] of the 1956 Olympic Games mentions ‘the unex pectedly cold weather before the Games began’ which was ‘squally for some weeks’ with ‘frequent heavy rains throughout the winter’. We have seen from press reports that it rained in Melbourne in the days after the first Maralinga detonation. 

The Royal Commission in its discussion of the 1957 Antler series of tests at Maralinga reported that 

The AWTSC was very concerned about the effect of rainfall on the contaminated cloud. Calculations had shown that high con centrations of radioactivity could conceivably be deposited by


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

rain as far as 1000 miles (1600 km) [emphasis added] from Ground Zero. Even though these calculations were considered ‘extremely pessimistic’, firing was to be postponed if the fore cast path of the cloud led into regions where rain was expected at the time the cloud would pass. 

The AWTSC published reports 

The UK official historian quoted Penney as claiming 

By a combination of good judgment, and good luck, the offsite fallout from Buffalo was minute. Every university, and numer ous cranks, were waiting with Geiger counters to detect radio activity. They got either zero results or such minute traces that many of them were convinced that the margin of safety was even greater than we claimed. 

The AWTSC were similarly complacent – or complicit. 

The official Australian-nominated advisors appointed by the Menzies government to its Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee in 1955 published two articles[43] in the prestigious Australian Journal of Sci ences in 1957 and 1958. Discussing ‘Radioactive Fallout in Australia from Operation Mosaic’ (six months before the Games) they ex plained that 

The radioactive products of the fission reaction and the greater proportion of the radioactive particles which arise from the va porization by the fireball of unfissioned radioactive material, bomb casing, and ancillary equipment, remain in the cauli flower-like head of the cloud in the form of an exceedingly fine aerosol. It is this high cloud, composed of exceedingly fine particles, that is the source of ‘long range’ or ‘delayed’ fallout. 

There is another source of fallout 

that can lead to light contamination at considerable distances from the explosion centre and away from the path of the high


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

cloud. This arises because small particles of fine radioactive particles are left behind in the stem of the mushroom cloud. The fallout of this material is affected more strongly by the lower wind structure than the heavy particles constituting ‘close in’ fallout and it is possible for it to be transported many miles from the scene of operations. 

The Safety Committee accepted that 

From general considerations, it would be apparent that radio active deposition would occur on the mainland unless each test was conducted during an interval of interruption to the prevail ing [emphasis added] wind circulation. 

So the challenge was ‘the detection of breaks in the dominant wind patterns’. They report measurements from 30 monitoring stations us ing ‘gummed film’ – aka sticky paper – and comment ‘It is interesting to note that the large population centres, Adelaide, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney received no fallout at all.’ Or at least ‘if any activity was present, it was too small to measure’ by the methods they deployed. 

There were several ‘misstatements’ in the article AWTSC published in 1958 in its Australian Journal of Science on Radioactive Fallout in Aus tralia from Operation Buffalo

Misstatement #1 

AWTSC made no mention of rain 

in Melbourne after Round One, One Tree 

For Operation Buffalo, the AWTSC reported that ‘After the first explo sion both the primary and secondary clouds moved almost due east.’ No mention is made of the 3.5 mm of rain recorded by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology that fell in Melbourne on September 28, as al luded to in the Argus articles including the press releases issued by the Minister of Supply on September 29.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Misstatement #2 

Kite detonation was a ground burst 

not the claimed ‘safer’ airburst 

40 days before opening of the 

1956 Melbourne Olympics 

The AWTSC published report in 

1958 stated that ‘one [weapon] 

was dropped from a Valiant 

bomber and fused to fire above 

the surface of the earth’.[44] Over 

page, it was stated ‘On 11 Octo 

ber 1956, Round 3, also a device 

of low yield, was dropped from 

an aircraft and detonated above 

the surface of the desert.’[45] 

The film footage available online shows that in fact Kite detonated on the surface and the fireball clearly behaved as a fireburst. 

In the six months before the opening of the 1956 Olympic Games downwind of both the Monte Bellos and Maralinga test sites, Britain detonated 6 hybrid fission-fusion bombs in preparation for the deton ation of the British H bomb off Christmas Island in May 1957. 

The sixth test was Kite detonated at Maralinga on October 11, 1956 – less than 6 weeks before the opening of the Games on November 22. 

The British official historian of British atomic and nuclear testing in Australia, Lorna Arnold, wrote in 1987[46] that when the British Chiefs of Staff were talking of trials in 1955 or, as happened, in the Australian Spring of 1956 

They want [sic] an airburst to prove the Blue Danube (MK1 bomb); the centre section had been exploded at Totem, and de liveries to the RAF had already begun, but an operational test was obviously desirable as soon as possible, if only too give at least one aircrew the experience of dropping it.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

In 1990 the military historian Humphrey Wynn told a seminar on The Origins and Development of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces 1945-1960 of the Royal Air Force Historical Society[47] that 

the first production bombs with this [atomic] warhead – Blue Danube – were delivered to RAF Wittering in 1953 . . . The even tual climax of the development effort – the bomb and the V bomber – occurred on 11 October 1956, when, in the Operation Buffalo trials at Maralinga, South Australia, a live Blue Danube was successfully dropped from a Valiant of No 49 Squadron . . . 

Air Vice-Marshall W.E. Oulton, Task Force Commander of the Christ mas Island H bomb tests six months later told the same seminar in 1990[48]

As for the prototype thermonuclear device itself, that would be contained in the only available bomb case of suitable size in proven ballistics, the Blue Danube case . . . 

As Joseph Rotblat explained in a publication for the Stockholm Inter national Peace Research Institute in 1981[49]

For explosions above ground the altitude of the burst and size of the fire-ball have an important bearing on the magnitude of the early fall-out. If the fire-ball touches the ground, the soil and other materials are vaporized and taken up with the fire-ball. The strong after-winds cause huge quantities of dirt and debris to be sucked up. They mix with the radioactive fragments of the bomb and form particles of various sizes which move upwards as well as spreading out. Later they begin to fall to the ground under the force of gravity, at rates and distances depending on the size of the particles and the velocity of the wind. This depos ition of radioactivity constitutes the early, or local, fall-out. On the other hand, if the bomb is exploded at such a height that the fire-ball never touches the ground there is much less or even no local fall-out but there will be global, or delayed, fall-out.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

UK official historian Lorna Arnold in her 1987 report A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapons Trials in Australia[50] (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office London 1987) wrote regarding Kite – 

It was to be a Service operational test of a Blue Danube bomb, and originally the expected yield had been some 40 kilotons, which would have produced little fallout from firing at an alti tude of about 1200ft. But there was a remote possibility that the fuzing system might fail and that the bomb would hit the ground before exploding. A groundburst of 40 kilotons would be quite unacceptable, and various safety devices were con sidered that would prevent detonation on impact . . . a low yield version was used instead, to be dropped from a Valiant bomber and fuzed to detonate at 500ft. The expected yield was 3 kilotons . . . It was successfully carried out on 11 October, [1956] 15.30 hours. Later, Penney reported back to Aldermas ton: 

‘RAF did a lovely job. Brilliant flash and fireball. Some trees set on fire and many scorched. Terrific dust cloud and stem. Im pressive scar on desert, surface torn and rocks scattered in cent ral area. Atmosphere very dry and stable with inversion at 14000 ft where cloud stopped as predicted. Blast and heat indic ate 3 to 4 kilotons, nearer 3 . . . ‘[51] 

The official UK historian listed[52] Kite as ‘Airburst: freefall at 150 m with 3 kiloton yield’ [emphasis added] 

However archival film footage available online shows that Kite was a ground burst

• clip2 – gives three views from different cameras; the fireball can be seen in the first seconds of the explosion, with the desert horizon clearly in view and no sign of a fireball in the sky. Rewinding slowly gives a clearer picture of the fireball. 

• see around 1:43 minutes.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

• see around 1:41 minutes. 

In their 2014 book Valiant Boys True Stories from the Operators of the UK’s First Four-Jet Bomber[53] which is endorsed by a Foreword from Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham, Tony Blackman – a former test pilot – and Anthony Wright – a former Valiant pilot – report that Flt Lt John Ledger was co-pilot of the Valiant that dropped the first live bomb in the British test series in Australia – at Kite/Buffalo on October 11, 1952. 

Interestingly, John Ledger has no recollection of any particular debate as to whether a ground site in Australia should be used for atomic explosions. The crew did think that it was strange to be permitted to drop such a powerful weapon over land with the potential risk of fallout being spread over an inhabited area. This was particularly the case when the wind changed direction and caused the fallout to be blown over the southern towns. 

The weapon being dropped was called Blue Danube and was similar in size and shape to the Tallboy HE weapon of WWII, but had an operational explosive yield of 40 kilotons. The original plan was to use a standard bomb, fused to detonate at 1,200 feet. However, if the fusing system failed, a surface burst of 40 kilo tons was unacceptable so the bomb was modified to give a three-kiloton yield with a burst altitude of 500 feet. Captained by Sqn Ldr Flavell, the aircraft let go the weapon at 35,000 feet visually aimed after a rad-controlled run-up. Telemetry con firmed a burst height between 500/600 feet, 100 yards to port and 60 yards short of the target.[54] 

However the crew of the Valiant did not see the moment of detona tion. 

With regards to the special modification state of the aircraft, WZ366 had been fitted with windscreen blinds (John [Ledger] thinks made of steel) that obliterated all view from the cockpit. There was a small central slot in the blind that allowed the crew to see out for take-off and landing, which was then closed after take-off. This would explain the emphasis on instrument flying


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

during the buildup and training phase in the UK. John thinks that the A bomb was dropped from the visual bomb aimer’s po sition with the navigator then scrambling back to his seat post release. The crew seemed to know about the initial shock wave which he describes as moderate to severe turbulence. However, they were less prepared for the severity of the return wave, which caused them some consternation. John said that the nav igator did not get back to his seat in time and was thrown about the rear cockpit due to the blast wave, much to the amusement of the rest of the crew.[55] 

The Royal Commission noted at Volume 1, p.287 8.2.23 that 

The explosion went as planned and it was a true airburst, i.e. the fireball did not reach the ground. The top of the cloud reached 15 000 feet [Re 299, T25/58]. 

Misstatement #3 AWTSC does not report 

rainfall in Melbourne after Kite 

Veering of the lower level winds following the explosion led to a southerly diffusion of slowly settling material of low activity. Arrival of this material at the surface was detected over South Aus tralia, Victoria and N.S.W. during the period 12 to 16 October, the delay resulting from the light wind regime. [emphasis added] 

This was despite the fact that the AWTSC states ‘No rain was ob served over the south-east areas of the continent throughout the whole of this period.’ In fact, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology recorded rain in Melbourne peaking at 35.1 mm on October 19th – only paralleled through the whole of 1956 by a 34.0 mm rainfall recor ded in January. 

The sketch map of cloud passage provided in the AWTSC article on Buffalo does not accurately reflect the distribution of fallout as recon structed by the Royal Commission from the AWTSC’s own data.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Misstatement #4: 

AWTSC diagram shows westerly cloud movement but their data show easterly fallout for Round 4 

Similarly with the final shot fired shortly after midnight on October 22: ‘No rain fell in the areas over which the cloud moved.’ BUT the cloud trajectories diagram for Round 4 in the 1958 AWTSC paper do not correspond with the data reported in the map drawn from the pa per’s ‘sticky paper‘ data by the Royal Commission in 1985 labelled ‘The Distribution of Fallout over Australia from the Buffalo 4 test.’ 

Misstatement #5: 

Thyroid uptake data far more extensive 

than sticky paper readings 

Several weeks before the second AWTSC paper was published in Oc tober 1958, Hedley Marston, a biochemist with the Division of Bio-


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

chemistry and General Nutrition of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in Adelaide, published his report[56] on ‘THE ACCUMULATION OF RADIOACTIVE IODINE IN THE THYROIDS OF GRAZING ANIMALS SUBSEQUENT TO ATOMIC WEAPON TESTS.’ Marston wrote that he 

volunteered in October 1955 to undertake this investigation as a part of the Operation Buffalo Biological Programme that was conducted conjointly by the Agricultural Research Council and the Medical Research Council. The data reported in this paper were cleared for publication in November 1957. 

The members of the AWTSC were closely involved in the ‘vetting’ of Marston’s paper in 1956, 1957 and 1958. 

Every sentence of his summary challenged the complacency of the physicists and meteorologist on the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee. He wrote 

Radioactivity due to 1311 was found in thyroid glands collected from sheep and cattle depastured on areas in various parts of Australia subsequent to atomic weapon tests conducted during 1956 at Monte Bello and at Maralinga. Thyroids from cattle were found to contain up to 830 mfLc 1311 (37 mfLc 1311/g of tissue) and from sheep, up to 144 mfLc 1311 (70 mfLc 1311/g of tissue). The uneven degree of contamination of pastures was emphasized by the fact that some of the highest concentrations of 1311 were observed in glands collected from individuals of flocks and herds grazing on terrain 1500-2000 miles distant from the site of the explosions [emphasis added]. As the tests proceeded, fluctu ations in the 1311 content of the thyroid glands of grazing stock indicated that many areas received repeated dressings of radioactive debris [emphasis added]. 

Both the 1957 and 1958 AWTSC papers stated that the radioiodine up take by grazing animals reported by Marston would have no effect on the animals or the human food chain.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Marston concluded that 

The results of a survey of the amounts of 1311 found in the thyroid glands of animals grazing in various parts of Australia that are reported in this paper indicate that extensive areas of Australia have been contaminated, and that some of the more heavy precipitations occurred on terrain situated over 1500 miles from the site of the explosions, in areas more or less thickly populated [emphasis added]. 

He pointed to the ‘uneven distribution of the deposited radioactive debris’. And he commented that 

a noteworthy feature of the series is that after the second Mon tebello explosion, the concentrations of 1311 in the thyroid glands remained, within the expected limits of variance, relat ively constant for a period of about 40 days before beginning to decrease exponentially. 

Which is a short process of iterative half-lives of radioactive material in the food chain that would end up among other places in the meals of the thousands of athletes and visitors for the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne. 

Misstatement #6: 

The Contamination of Adelaide in Round 3 

The 1958 AWTSC paper states blandly that 

Veering of the lower level winds following the [October 11] ex plosion led to a southerly diffusion of slowly settling material of low activity. Arrival of this material was detected over South Australia, Victoria and N.S.W during the period 12 to 16 Octo ber, the delay resulting from the light wind regime. No rain was observed over the south-east areas of the whole continent.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

In fact, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology show 3.6 mm rain fell in Adelaide on October 11 and approximately 15 mm in the week fol lowing the third detonation. 

Be that as it may, Marston reported that, ‘The greater part of the pre cipitation [of fallout] occurred on two rainless days’ in Adelaide.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Marston had a particular interest in his home city of Adelaide and his data showed ‘Contamination of Adelaide and its environs with fall out from the third Maralinga explosion’ that 

provided an opportunity to establish unequivocally that ex tremely little if any of the considerable amount of 1311 that be came concentrated in the thyroids found its way to the glands via the lungs; and the occasion rendered possible a detailed study of the rates of rise and fall of 1311 in the thyroid glands of grazing animals in relation to the degree of contamination of the pastures. 

Misstatement #7: 

Radioiodine uptake ‘far below those that are 

expected to produce any observable effects’ 

Both the 1957 and 1958 AWTSC papers stated that the radioiodine up take by grazing animals reported by Marston would have no effect on the animals or the food chain. 

Marston on the other hand considered that his observations 

emphasize the speed with which grazing animals assimilate and concentrate 131I from constituents of the fission products that become deposited on pasture in areas traversed by the clouds of debris arising from atomic explosions. In these cir cumstances it may reasonably be assumed that a rapid accumu lation of 131I in the thyroids of grazing cattle indicates a rapid gathering of 89Sr [Strontium], 90Sr [Strontium], and of other bone-seeking isotopes, and a speedy launching of these radio active substances, via milk, into human foodstuffs, thence to the skeleton where they become deposited preferentially at the sites where mineralization is proceeding. 

He added a footnote stating that ‘As the process of osteogenesis is particularly intensified in the very young, the risk is greater in foetal and neo-natal subjects.’


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

It was nearly two years after the 1956 Olympics when Marston’s pa per was published, and a year after the British weaponeers shifted their testing ground to Christmas Island, having escalated from atomic to thermonuclear devices. The delay in publication had been caused by the extended review process the paper went through. 

According to the Royal Commission in 1985 the AWTSC particularly objected to the reference to strontium – 

It must be pointed out that there is no experimental evidence to support the assertion that either leukaemia or bone cancer are induced by the low [emphasis added] levels of radiostrontium associated with fallout. 

In fact, Marston had cited the British Medical Research Council’s 1956 White Paper on Hazards[57] which discusses strontium 90 extensively. And Dr Hopper had told the Argus in 1956, 

If danger there could be, it would be in regard to the strontium content absorbed in the rain. If accumulated in the bones in suf ficient strength, it could cause cancer. But it might be a cancer that would not be evident for 20 years or more. And who then could say that the cause was radioactive rain that might have fallen over Victoria in 1956? 

The continuing cover-up 

An exchange of views submitted to The Australian Journal of Biological Sciences, where Marston’s paper had been published ‘were with drawn at the suggestion of Sir Macfarlane Burnet, who was on the ed itorial board of the Journal’ according to the Royal Commission. Bur net, Chairman of the National Radiation Advisory Committee, wrote to Titterton in November 1958: 

I am frankly worried by the situation because of its latent poten tialities to give rise to action which could be labelled by the press as an attempt by Government to interfere with scientific integrity, or on the other side, as an attempt by left wing scient-


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

ists to interfere with defence preparation. All concerned are fully aware that neither is the case. 

The Royal Commission concluded that the AWTSC ‘was very high handed in its treatment of Marston’. The only newspaper that repor ted this study was Stock and Land. According to Roger Cross who has written a study[58] of what came to be known as The Marston Contro versy, not even the Adelaide Advertiser reported the finding that Ad elaide had been contaminated at least once by atomic fallout from the Maralinga tests weeks before the Olympics started further east in Melbourne. Cross has suggested that a D-Notice was issued to the mainstream press but missed being served on Stock and Land

The cover-up has continued over the ensuing 60 years. The UK official historian wrote in 1987 – thirty years after publication of the thyroid paper, when the relationship between uptake of Iodine 131 and Stron tium 90 accumulation in bones was well established – that Marston ‘drew erroneous inferences from his iodine-131 results, with no sup porting experimental data’. But she also reported the awareness of the importance of Strontium 90 as a radiation hazard, which led to the formation of Operation Sunshine in October 1956 in which American, British and Canadian scientists agreed to test soil, milk, food and an imal and human bones for evidence of strontium 90 accumulation. She reported ‘Penney quickly suggested to Martin, as chairman of the AWTSC, that Australian samples should also be collected.’ Eventu ally the mounting evidence of the fallout of strontium 90 contributed significantly to the signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. 

The Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of Data on Atmo spheric Fallout Arising from British Nuclear Tests in Australia[59], re leased in May 1984, found the methodology of AIRAC 9 (produced by the Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council in 1983) for calcu lating the collective dose-estimates for long-range fallout on the Aus tralian population from the British atomic tests to be simplistic and ‘did not take into account additional plumes (and stem materials) arising from the variability in meteorological parameters with eleva tion above ground zero at the time of and immediately after, firing’. The Expert Committee


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

disagreed with AIRAC on many fundamental issues including interpretation of information on fallout levels, progress of ra dioactive clouds, dosage estimates, risks of exposure to certain groups and aspects of management and arrangements during the tests. Most of all it disagreed with the philosophy used to construct AIRAC 9 – the use of simplified assumptions which do not accurately reflect the complexities of what took place and the constant endeavour to present the best possible case which res ults, to quote the Canberra Times, in a comfortable picture of the British nuclear tests. 

But the Expert Committee also made no reference to the Olympic Games held a month after the last of the 1956 tests. 

This expert review committee was trenchant in its methodological cri ticisms but gentlemanly in its attribution of responsibility for this work which it dismissed. The Committee 

had access to much of the official material and other data used in the preparation of the AIRAC report. It assumes therefore, that AIRAC was constrained by interpretations of secrecy and possibly other pressures which did not constrain the present Committee. It further assumed that this was the reason that AIRAC had to treat information in the way it did. Accordingly the committee wishes to state that its criticism is directed only towards the document AIRAC 9 and not towards the Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, the scientific capabilities of whose members it holds in high regard. 

The Committee did not explain why it felt freer to express its concerns only a year after the AIRAC 9 report, but ‘concluded that there was a need for a comprehensive public account of the consequences of the British nuclear tests on Australians and their environment’. This res ulted in the Royal Commission. 

In its 1985 report, the Royal Commission noted that two researchers from the Australian Radiation Laboratory re-evaluated the fallout data with different assumptions than AIRAC 9 and


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

arrived at a somewhat larger estimate of collective dose to the Australian population. Their calculations result in estimates of seven cancers and seven serious hereditary defects, although they point out that these estimates could be too high by a factor of 10 or too low by a factor of two . . . 

Not surprisingly, ‘The Royal Commission believes that the data avail able for estimating the collective dose to the Australian population are insufficient to permit a useful estimate to be made.’ 

The Royal Commission stated clearly that 

At the time of the test there was no general acceptance that small doses received by the population at large might increase the number of cancers in later years. A current evaluation of the likelihood of harmful effects of ionising radiation or contact with radioactive substances produced by the tests must be based on the hypothesis that any dose of radiation, no matter how small, is likely to increase the risk of harmful stochastic ef fects. 

It concluded that 

By reason of the detonation of the major trials and the depos ition of fallout across Australia, it is probable that cancers which would not otherwise have occurred have been caused in the Australian population. 

But ‘the Royal Commission has been unable to quantify the probable increase in the risk of cancer among the participants in the trial pro gram or among the Australian population in general’. Nor, of course, they might have added but didn’t, in the participants and spectators at the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne a month after the first round of atomic weapons tests at Maralinga a thousand miles away as the wind blows.


Counting down to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics: 

Cockups and Coverups 

Who was responsible? 

Meteorology was the responsibility of the Australians for the 1956 Buffalo tests. How could the most senior meteorologist in the country have acceded to atomic bomb tests in the weeks just before the 1956 Olympic Games from a ground zero plum in the path of prevailing westerley air streams? What pressures were brought to bear? The Royal Commission concluded that 

The AWTSC failed to carry out many of its tasks in a proper manner. At times it was deceitful and allowed unsafe firing to occur. It deviated from its charter by assuming responsibilities which properly belonged to the Australian Government. 

It also noted that the English scientist member, Titterton, 

played a political as well as a safety role in the testing program, especially in the minor trials. He was prepared to conceal in formation from the Australian Government and his fellow Committee members if he believed to do so would suit the in terests of the United Kingdom Government and the testing pro gram. 

But not even the 1985 Royal Commission mentioned the continued testing up to a month before the 1956 Olympic Games.

The Olympic Cauldron at the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne



Arnold L. A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Tri als in Australia, HMSO, London, 1987 

Beale H. This Inch of Time, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1977 

Butement WAS et al. Radioactive Fallout in Australia from Opera tion Mosaic, Australian Journal of Science, December 1957 

Butement WAS et al. Radioactive Fallout in Australia from Opera tion Buffalo, Australian Journal of Science, October 1958 

Cross R. Fallout: Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Aus tralia, Wakefield Press, 2001 

Marston HR. The Accumulation of Radioactive iodine in the Thyroids of Grazing Animals Subsequent to Atomic Weapon Tests, Australian Journal of Biological Science, II: 3 August 1958 

Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear tests in Aus tralia, 3 vols. 1985 

1. _waste/RoyalCommissioninToBritishNucleartestsinAus traliaVol%201.pdf 

2. _waste/RoyalCommissioninToBritishNucleartestsinAus traliaVol%202.pdf 


Report of the Expert Committee on the review of Data on Atmo spheric Fallout Arising from British Nuclear Tests in Australia, 31 May 1984


Buffalo films: 


/item/object/1060035430 • 

Symonds, JL. A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, Can berra, Australian Government Printing Resources, Department of Resources and Energy, 1985



1. Meanjin, December 1956 p.332 

2. A6455, Part 1, FCO/C/19/8 

3. A6455, Part 1, no FCO number, p.33 

4. A6455, Part 1, no FCO number, p.37 

5. A6455, Part 1, no FCO number, p.28 

6. A6455, Part 1, FCO/C/19/15 

7. A6455, Part 1, FCO/C/19/18 

8. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/19/28 

9. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/19/38 

10. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/23/17 

11. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/20/17 

12. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/20/26 

13. A6455, RC599, Part 1, FCO/C/20/30 

14. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/20/33 

15. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/20/36 

16. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO/C/24/7 

17. A6455, RC559, Part 1, FCO /C/24/10 

18. A6455, RC559, Part 2, FCO/C/26/16 

19. A6455, RC559, Part 2, FCO/C/26/17 

20. A6455, RC559, Part 2, FCO number obscured at p.118 21. A6455, RC559, Part 2, FCO/C/24/91 

22. Daniel Lang. Fallout. The New Yorker July 16, 1955 23. sources-radiation/more-radiation-sources/british-nuclear weapons-testing 

24. A6455, RCC559, Part 2, FCO/C/1/2 

25. A6455, RCC599, Part 2, no FCO number cover note dated 15 August 1952 

26. A6455, RC559, Part 2, FCO/C/31 

27. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/31/7 

28. A655, RC599, Part 2, FCO 31/6 

29. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/32/8 

30. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/25/12 

31. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/31/15 

32. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/31/17 

33. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/31/19 

34. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/31/21 

35. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO number obscured, at p.314


36. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO number obscured, pp. 318-9 37. A6455, RC599, Part 2, FCO/C/26/11 

38. Transcript online NAA:A6448,14 

39. Macmillan and Company London 1956 

40. Transcribed at page 294 of Symonds History 

41. Arnold, p.105 

42. official-report-1956.php 


44. AJS 1958 p.63 

45. AJS 1958 p.64 

46. Arnold, A Very Special Relationship p.94 

47. The Proceedings of the Royal Air Force Historical Society Issue no 7 February 1990 p.12 

48. pp.20-21 

49. SIPRI/Rotblat Nuclear Radiation in Warfare 1981 p.12 50. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 

51. pp.163-4 

52. p.287 

53. London Grub Street, 2014 

54. p.36 

55. pp.36-37 

56. 57. 


58. Roger Cross Fallout: Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia. Wakefield Press 2001